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I do not believe that anyone is a born teacher or a born mathematician. 
This means that I face the problem of explaining how one becomes a 
teacher or a mathematician. The change of being/doing/knowing that is 
involved in becoming a teacher or a mathematician can be called learning, 
and I am interested in this process. Here I will recount some stories of 
learning and use them to explore my current thinking about becoming a 
mathematics teacher. 
I begin by exploring the claim that knowing is being is doing and how 
this claim applies to being a teacher. I then explore the process of 
becoming a mathematician, and the nature of mathematics. I claim that 
mathematics is defined by a peculiar criterion for the explanations that are 
considered acceptable, that I refer to as a ‘mathematical emotional 
orientation’. I close with some speculations on how one might influence 
others to share the mathematical emotional orientation, thus becoming 
mathematicians, and hence knowing mathematics. 
Becoming a teacher  <level 1 heading> 
Laurinda Brown has a story of her first experience in initial teacher 
education, after years of working with inservice teachers. She began by 
using the same prompts she had learned in those years, and her students 
responded to her prompts with stories about all sorts of things she did not 
expect. Afterwards she commented to her colleague John Hayter that she 
now knew that the course did something to create teachers by the end of it, 
but she did not know what. 
This story interests me because it describes what happens in teacher 
education as a change in being, not as the acquisition of knowledge. And I 
suspect many teacher educators could tell similar stories. We observe 
novice teachers making decisions that seem odd to us, and describe the 
event as the novice not yet thinking like a teacher, as opposed to not yet 
having knowledge a teacher has. Teacher educators describe learning 
teaching as becoming a teacher. 
How do we recognise that someone has become a teacher? In Laurinda’s 
story, she had developed prompts that reliably provoked the responses she 
expected from teachers, but not from her students. 
If someone claims to know algebra, that is, to be an algebraist, we demand of 
him or her to perform in the domain of what we consider algebra to be, and if 
according to us she or he performs adequately in that domain, we accept the 
claim. (Maturana, 1987, p. 325) 
If someone claims to know teaching, that is to be a teacher, we provide a 
prompt to action in the domain of teaching. 
Becoming a mathematician [1]  <level 1 heading> 
In recent years the main focus of my teaching has been teaching 
mathematics to future primary school teachers in Germany. My focus is on 
thinking mathematically, a focus Laurinda observed in Alf Coles’ teaching 
(Brown & Coles 2008) and which Alf associates with ‘becoming a 
mathematician’ (Coles 2013). While Alf and I associate different doings 
with being a mathematician, we both see teaching mathematics as 
changing our students’ beings, not as imparting knowledge. 
For Alf, doings that are associated with being a mathematician are 
“asking questions, spotting patterns, making conjectures or predictions 
[and] giving reasons or justifications” (p. 6). I agree that mathematicians 
do all these things. But if I observe a person doing these things, do I 
observe a mathematician? Historians ask questions, see patterns, make 
conjectures and give reasons. These doings seem to me to be common to 
any science (broadly meant, like Wissenschaft, to include all systematic 
inquiry). 
Some might say that what makes the mathematician different from the 
historian is not what s/he does, but what s/he does it to. This is typical of 
dictionary definitions that say mathematics is the science of number and 
space. I find this unsatisfactory. For one thing, this list of objects of 
mathematicians’ doings is clearly incomplete. Mathematicians explore 
many other objects. In fact, anything can be mathematised, and so become 
an object of mathematics, from juggling to lumber milling. For me trying 
to identify the nature of the objects of mathematics is the wrong approach. 
Instead, I prefer to look more carefully at the kind of science mathematics 
is. 
Maturana (1987) claims “the intention of doing art is to generate an 
aesthetic experience, and the intention of doing technology is to produce, 
the intention of doing science is to explain” (pp. 326–327). Hence, he 
refers to the sciences as ‘explanatory domains’. He outlines four 
‘operational conditions’ for the validation of scientific explanations: 
1. The specification of the phenomenon to be explained, by specifying what an 
observer must do to observe the phenomenon. 
2. A generative mechanism or explanatory hypothesis that gives rise to the 
phenomenon, but which operates at a meta-level to it. 
3. The deduction or prediction of other phenomena from the generative 
mechanism that an observer should be able to observe, and stipulation of what 
an observer must do to observe these phenomena. 
4. The actual witnessing of the predicted phenomena. (paraphrased from 
p. 327) 
These four conditions correspond well to Alf’s “spotting patterns” (1), 
“making conjectures or predictions” (3) and “giving reasons or 
justifications” (2). What is interesting is that (4) is not a doing associated 
with being a mathematician, nor is stipulation of what an observer must do 
to observe predicted phenomena (from 3). A mathematician’s deductions 
are not predictions to be tested; they are new phenomena. Mathematics is 
the science that does not test its predictions [2]. 
I find it unsatisfying to describe mathematics as a science lacking in a 
stage of validation other sciences have. I would prefer a more positive 
description. The key to such a description is the observation that without 
an empirical way to validate generative mechanisms, mathematicians 
instead seek to deduce them from other, somehow more fundamental, 
generative mechanisms. We call this proving theorems, and it is, I feel, 
what make mathematics unique. 
Learning about proof  <level 1 heading> 
As a master’s student at Concordia University, some decades ago, I shared 
a room with the back issues of FLM. I spent a lot of time reading them. 
One thing I read in that time was Efraim Fischbein’s 1982 article Intuition 
and proof, which appeared in FLM 3(2). I was a different person then, 
obviously, and so when I read the article then it was a different article than 
when I read it now. I recall then being annoyed that some trivial numerical 
datum had altered slightly from its presentation in an earlier PME paper. I 
am not sure the heart of the article (as I read it now), intuition and proof, 
touched me at all. 
A bit later I latched onto a phrase that occurs just after the key 
comments on intuition and proof, “to believe (fully, sympathetically, 
intuitively) in the a priori universality of the theorem guaranteed by the 
respective proof” (p. 17). Having recently become Lakatosian and 
sceptical about “a priori universality” I quoted this phrase as an example of 
a way of looking at proof to avoid. What I missed is the key point that 
learning about proof is not just about knowing, it is about being: 
In order to really understand what a mathematical proof means the learner’s 
mind must undergo a fundamental modification. Of course he can learn proofs 
and he can learn the general notion of a proof. But our research has shown that 
this is not enough. A profound modification is required. A new completely 
non-natural “basis of belief” is necessary, which is different from the way in 
which an empirical “basis of belief” is formed. (p. 17) 
I claim that mathematics is defined by Fischbein’s “basis of belief”. 
I connect Fischbein’s ‘basis of belief’ with what Maturana calls an 
‘emotion of acceptance’ or an ‘emotional orientation’. 
What distinguishes an observer in daily life from an observer as a scientist is 
the scientist’s emotional orientation to explaining his or her consistency in 
using only the criterion of validation of scientific explanations for the system 
of explanations that he or she generates in his or her particular domain of 
explanatory concerns. (Maturana, 1988, p. 36) 
Whether an observer operates in one domain of explanations or in another 
depends on his or her preference (emotion of acceptance) for the basic 
premises that constitute the domain in which he or she operates. (1988, p. 33) 
To operate in the mathematical domain of explanations means that one has 
accepted the basic premises that constitute the domain, that one has a 
mathematical emotional orientation, that one believes in proofs. 
This is the message in Fischbein’s article on Intuition and proof that it 
has taken me a long time to understand. Not that proof gives us access to 
absolute truth, but rather that proof gives us a feeling of certainty that is 
peculiar to mathematics, and that having that feeling is part of 
understanding proof, and indeed, understanding mathematics. This 
peculiar feeling is special to mathematics and makes mathematics special. 
How does one come to believe in proofs? <level 1 heading> 
There are actually a few different questions here. First, there is a way of 
reasoning, often called ‘deductive’, that is the only way of reasoning used 
in a finished proof. Finding a proof, of course, involves many different 
kinds of reasoning [3]. But believing in proofs requires, at least, being able 
to reason deductively. So the first question is how does one come to reason 
deductively. Second, proofs are usually presented and interpreted through 
language, and peculiar forms of language are often used. So a second 
question is how one learns to interpret these peculiar forms of language. If 
both deductive reasoning and the ability to interpret the form of a proof are 
present, there remains the issue of whether one accepts proofs as secure 
evidence or convincing explanation; whether one has a mathematical 
emotional orientation or basis of belief, an acceptance of the basic 
premises that constitute the domain. 
My answer to the first question is that children (at least those tested by 
psychologists) are capable of deductive reasoning, and I believe there are 
reasons why the human species as a whole should have learned to reason 
in this way a long time ago. I have discussed elsewhere [4] my reasons for 
believing this, and for now I wish to take it for granted. As for learning the 
peculiar forms of language employed in proofs, this is undoubtedly an 
issue, but people have demonstrated considerable capacity to learn other 
peculiar forms of language, from everyday speech to musical notation, and 
I do not see the language of proofs as an insurmountable obstacle to 
learning to prove. It is a third question that I find most interesting, the 
question of how one learns an emotional orientation. 
I have found this question interesting from the beginning of my teaching 
career. When I was studying to become a mathematics teacher, I met a 
woman who was studying to be a music teacher. She was convinced 
teaching music would be simple. She would play a piece by Beethoven, for 
example, and the students would be captured by its intrinsic beauty. She 
could then engage them in further reflections on the piece. “You,” I 
thought, “are going to be sorely disappointed.” I do not know if she was, 
but I certainly was when I went out to a school and tried the mathematical 
equivalent. I was asked to take over part of another teacher’s Grade 7 class 
for one day, as he had to do some special activity with the rest of the class. 
So I had a small group and freedom to choose what I taught. I chose to 
expose them to the intrinsic beauty of the classic proof of the irrationality 
of the square root of two. 
This proof is included in every collection of beautiful proofs. But my 
students did not see its beauty. As a new teacher this surprised me. I now 
know, having researched this myself since, that the reasoning involved in a 
proof by contradiction was not the issue. Much younger children can 
handle that. And the algebra involved should have been understandable to 
them. In fact, other researchers have had similar difficulties with this proof 
and university students, for whom the language is more familiar. But I 
suspect a mathematical emotional orientation is needed to find this proof 
explanatory, convincing, and perhaps even beautiful. 
So, how does one learn an emotional orientation? I do not know, but I 
have some ideas. 
Teaching through proving  <level 1 heading> 
I strongly suspect that approaches to teaching mathematics prevalent in the 
schools I am familiar with are not helping. To paraphrase Maturana: 
What distinguishes an observer in daily life from an observer as a 
mathematician is the mathematician’s consistency in using only mathematical 
proofs as explanations in mathematics. 
However, most students experience a dozen years of learning mathematics 
in which the mathematics they learn is explained in other ways, by 
reference to authority, by pattern spotting, or by simple repetition.  
These ways of explaining are not wrong. There are domains in which they 
are the appropriate ways to explain things. But they are not the appropriate 
ways of explaining in mathematics. That students do not learn that 
explanations in mathematics are of a certain kind is not surprising, because 
they are almost never offered such explanations. 
Dropping in the occasional proof does not really help. In other domains 
it is also sometimes possible to use deductive reasoning to explain, but 
only in special circumstances. If students experience mathematics as a 
domain in which occasionally proofs are used to explain, we should not be 
surprised that they would see nothing very different about mathematics in 
comparison to other sciences. 
I have come to believe that students could learn the mathematical 
emotional orientation by experiencing mathematics as a domain in which 
only mathematical proofs are offered and accepted as explanations. 
Inspired by the work of Gila Hanna, Magdalene Lampert, and Howard 
Fawcett, in 2011 I coined the name ‘proof-based teaching’ to describe a 
possible future approach to teaching mathematics in which students learn 
mathematics by proving [5]. A few years later I had the good fortune to 
meet Estela Vallejo-Vargas, who had been teaching divisibility to third 
graders in a way that seemed to capture what I meant by ‘proof-based’, 
and she was already researching her practice. Since then the two of us have 
been exploring further the nature and challenges of proof-based teaching. 
Learning to teach through proving <level 1 heading> 
One challenge we have been addressing brings me back to the beginning. 
For a teacher to change her teaching approach, her doing, requires a 
change of being. Estela can teach in a proof-based way as she is a teacher 
and a mathematician. But most primary school teachers, and even 
secondary school teachers in many places, do not think of themselves as 
mathematicians, and rightly so if they do not have a mathematical 
emotional orientation. The first step, in their learning to teach in a proof-
based way, is learning the mathematical emotional orientation. So I am 
back to the question, how does one learn an emotional orientation? 
Maturana makes a suggestion: 
The children do not learn mathematics in school; they learn how to live 
together with a mathematics teacher. Perhaps they will one day carry on this 
enjoyable and exciting kind of being together independently—and become 
mathematics teachers or mathematicians themselves. Teachers do not simply 
transmit some content; they acquaint their pupils with a way of living. In the 
process, the rules of arithmetic, the laws of physics, or the grammar of a 
language will be acquired. My claim is: Pupils learn teachers. (Maturana, in 
Gumbrecht, Maturana & Poerksen, 2006, p. 26) 
Estela has been working with inservice primary school teachers in Peru. 
She teaches them explanations for principles of divisibility they already 
‘know’ but have never explained mathematically, in a proof-based way. 
That is to say, she shares with them her way of living with divisibility and 
her way of being a teacher. This includes deriving three key notions from 
everyday experiences of fair sharing: that all the shares are equal, that 
nothing is broken, and that as many as possible are shared out. From these 
three key notions properties such as the remainder being smaller then the 
divisor are deduced, using a mixture of concrete models and verbal 
arguments (see Vallejo-Vargas & Ordoñez-Montañez, 2015). 
While they are learning about divisibility the inservice teachers reflect 
on what they are learning and the way they are learning with reference to 
the learning of children they will soon be attempting to influence. Estela 
then follows them to their classrooms, observes their teaching, and reflects 
on it with them. There are limits to the extent of the change of 
being/doing/knowing that Estela can observe in the short time she works 
with the teachers, but so far the results have been encouraging, with some 
of the teachers beginning to consider how they might approach other areas 
of their teaching differently. 
I also work with primary school teachers, but at the very beginning of 
their university teacher education programme. This means that, unlike in 
Estela’s case, they are not yet teachers. They have (mostly) just finished 
school, and my initial focus is on teaching them algebra in a proof-based 
way, so that they can explain mathematically the rules and techniques they 
‘know’ from school. Through this experience I hope they also begin to 
expect mathematical explanations in other areas of mathematics (and we 
later prove things in geometry, combinatorics, etc.) The context in which I 
do this is not ideal as there are a lot of students and I see them for only a 
couple of hours a week. 
One thing I do not like about this context is that I have limited insight 
into what my students are learning. One day, however, I did at least get 
some access into the learning of a teaching assistant who works with me, 
who attended the same schools as my students. In Germany students learn 
in school two formulae for solving quadratic equations, the ‘pq formula’ 
and the ‘abc formula’ [6] (which, when I went to school in the US, was 
called the ‘quadratic formula’). In one lecture I use geometric materials to 
physically ‘complete the square’ for several specific quadratic equations, 
and then I use one of these as a generic example to derive the pq formula. 
After that lecture ‘Mike’, my teaching assistant, walked with me back to 
my office, and told me a bit of his school history. He remembered learning 
completing the square as an algebraic procedure in school, one which he 
understood and accepted. His teacher then presented the class with the pq 
formula, without any explanation as far as Mike could recall. Mike refused 
to use the pq formula, solving any quadratic equations he encountered by 
completing the square. He could remember the formula, but without an 
explanation, a generative mechanism, a proof, he was not willing to use it. 
In my lecture he had seen the connection between the formula and 
completing the square for the first time, and now was willing to use the 
formula, having seen it deduced from a procedure he accepted. 
I find this interesting because to me it shows that Mike had a 
mathematical emotional orientation all along. He was never offered a 
mathematical explanation of why the pq formula works and so he rejected 
it. Seeing the connection between the pq formula and completing the 
square explained it, and changed his emotion towards it. The formula went 
from something for which he had negative feelings, a way of solving 
quadratic equations he knew of, but avoided, to one he now recognised as 
a different representation of a familiar procedure. That change of feeling, 
rather than any change in the commodity ‘knowledge’, is a change in his 
being. 
Maturana notes that when an utterance “is accepted and becomes an 
explanation, the emotion or mood of the observer shifts from doubt to 
contentment, and he or she stops asking over and over again the same 
question” (1988, p. 28). This seems to capture what happened to Mike 
with regard to the pq formula. Something similar happened with Estela’s 
teachers when they observed their students engaged in the mathematical 
activity that Estela had described, but which the teacher had never before 
seen in their classrooms. Here there is also a shift from doubt to 
contentment. 
Why should one learn the mathematical emotional orientation? 
<level 1 heading> 
Once upon a time mathematics was suggested as an explanatory domain 
that all others should imitate. This idea runs through writing from 
Descartes’ 1637 Méthode to Fawcett’s 1938 The Nature of Proof. We now 
live in an age that is sceptical of such grand, universal narratives, and so it 
might be asked why I am interested in exposing all children to the 
mathematical emotional orientation. I do not claim that mathematics is a 
better explanatory domain than others. I do not wish (as Descartes did) to 
apply deductive reasoning to all aspects of human activity. I merely claim 
that mathematics is a unique explanatory domain, and hence affords 
learners some unique opportunities. I wish to insist that explanations in 
mathematics be restricted to deductive reasoning, because it is the only 
domain in which deductive reasoning is the only appropriate way of 
explaining. And this way of explaining, as Fischbein notes, can give rise to 
a feeling of certainty unlike the feelings of certainty that arise in other 
domains. Of course it is not really certain, but nonetheless I believe it is an 
important feeling to experience, if only to cast other feelings of certainty in 
a different light. I believe it is important to recognise that there are 
different domains of explanation, with different feelings of certainty. 
Mathematics is special, and one way in which it is special is that its criteria 
for explanations are so well defined that they can be turned on themselves. 
In mathematics, one can reason about reasoning; one can prove what can 
be proven. And its way of explaining can be empowering. 
Estela told me a story that illustrates this empowerment. She was 
observing in the classroom of one of the teachers she works with. The 
students had worked in small groups on an activity and then discussed it as 
a whole class, and out of that discussion the following property and its 
justification was written down on a big sheet of paper that was placed on 
one of the classroom’s walls: 
Property: “In a division the remainder must be smaller than the number of 
people. The maximum remainder would be equal to the number previous to the 
number of people” 
Justification: “Because if the remainder is bigger than the maximum 
remainder then it could still be distributed and it would not be a remainder” 
To Estela something seemed not quite right here. She asked, “What 
happens when the remainder is equal to-” but was interrupted by students 
saying (almost shouting) “It can still be distributed!”. The teacher asked 
Estela where the error was, perhaps interpreting Estela’s question as a 
polite way of indicating to the teacher that an error has been made. This 
sometimes happens when an expert, brought into the school to advise the 
teachers, wants to point out an error in a way that allows the teacher to 
correct it without losing her own authority in the classroom. Following 
Estela’s instructions, the teacher ‘corrected’ the justification: 
Justification: “Because if the remainder is bigger than, or equal to, the 
maximum remainder then it could still be distributed and it would not be a 
remainder” 
The students objected, pointing out that only if the remainder is equal to 
the number of people does a problem occur, but “if it would be equal to the 
maximum remainder, there would not be any problems”. The students, 
Estela and the teacher argued for some time (27 turns in the transcript) 
before Estela and the teacher proposed a concrete example, through which 
they finally saw what the students had been pointing out all along. In a 
community that shares a mathematical emotional orientation, that agrees 
on the criterion of validation of mathematical explanations, eight year olds 
can argue successfully with an expert. I think that is an important 
experience for them to have, and mathematics is one of the few domains 
where this is genuinely possible. That is why it is important to learn, and 
teach, the mathematical emotional orientation. 
  
Notes 
[1] I feel a tension as I write this, between my thoughts and the language I 
am expressing them in. I wish to write about verbs: being, doing, 
knowing, teaching, … . That ellipsis marks where I was going to 
continue the list with the verb for what mathematicians do. ‘Teaching’ is 
a verb, and so above it was fairly straightforward to link being a teacher 
with teaching. Interestingly, ‘knowing teaching’ does not come so 
easily. With mathematics I have a different problem. ‘Mathematics’ is a 
noun, a ‘thing’ one knows, so being a mathematician links easily to 
knowing mathematics, but what is the verb, akin to ‘teaching’ for ‘doing 
mathematics’? 
 Words have been coined, for example ‘mathing’, but they do not enjoy 
the currency of ‘teaching’. Better known words like ‘mathematising’ 
have evolved to refer to something a little different. This limitation of 
my language limits my thinking, probably in some ways I am not aware 
of. The equating of being, doing, knowing is helpful in making me 
aware of some ways of thinking my language makes difficult. 
[2] Some readers will be objecting, “but Lakatos shows that mathematics 
is a quasi-empirical science of proof and refutations!” Not quite. Lakatos 
offers convincing (to me) narratives that suggest that some mathematical 
discovery occurs through cycles of proof and refutations, but that does 
not mean all mathematical discovery occurs in the same way. And note 
that the counter-examples in those narratives were not observed because 
a specific prediction had been made that was then tested using those 
examples. The examples were stumbled upon, for the most part. Even 
when mathematics is quasi-empirical, it does not make predictions in 
order to test them. 
[3] At least for humans, and I would question if a proof found by a 
computer counts before it is read by a human whose reasoning and  
feelings are modified by it. 
[4] Reid, D. (2013) The biological basis for deductive reasoning. In Ubuz, 
B., Haser, Ç, Mariotti, M.A.(Eds.) Proceedings of the Eighth Congress 
of the European Society for Research in Mathematics Education, pp. 
206–215. Ankara, Turkey: ERME. 
[5] Reid, D. (2011) Understanding proof and transforming teaching. In 
Wiest, L. & Lamberg, T. (Eds.) Proceedings of the Thirty-third Annual 
Meeting of the North American Chapter of the International Group for 
the Psychology of Mathematics Education. (pp. 15–30) Reno NV: 
University of Nevada. 
[6] They are: 
 <insert Reid Equation 1 here>  and  <insert Reid Equation 2 here>  
 The pq formula is a rearrangement of the quadratic formula when a = 1. 
For some reason b then becomes p and c becomes q.  
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